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Abstract 
We develop a game-theoretic model in which taxpayers, tax practitioners 
and a tax agency all interact to determine the extent of tax compliance. The 
model focuses exclusively on the service aspects of third-party assistance. We 
characterize four types of equilibria, depending on whether taxpayers prefer to 
use tax practitioners and whether the tax agency prefers them to use tax 
practitioners. In the empirically relevant case, which occurs when tax 
practitioner penalties for noncompliance are sufficiently low and the efficiency 
gains from using practitioners are sufficiently high, the tax agency prefers 
taxpayers to prepare their own returns, but taxpayers prefer to use a tax 
practitioner. In this case, the use of a tax practitioner is associated with 
lower compliance and higher audit rates. 
1. Introduction
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Professional income tax preparers account for over half of all individual 
income tax returns filed and an even greater proportion of complex returns filed 
(Jackson and Milliron, 1987). Of these preparers, a significant proportion are 
qualified to represent clients before the Internal Revenue Service. The American 
Bar Association Commission on Taxpayer Compliance (1987) refers to these 
individuals as tax practitioners: ''Like preparers, practitioners can prepare 
and sign returns, but the term is used to distinguish them from preparers who 
cannot represent clients during Internal Revenue Service audits and other 
enforcement actions" (p. 56). Practitioners can provide a variety of services
in addition to tax preparation; they 1:are often consulted by taxpayers facing 
audits, may accompany or represent clients during the audit itself, may 
participate in appeals of audit decisions within the IRS and in court, and may 
negotiate tax payment arrangements" (Kinsey, 1987, p. 1). Practitioners can also 
play a role in identifying strategies for minimizing tax liability (Klepper and 
Nagin, 1988). 
There is no question that tax preparers are a significant presence in the 
revenue collection process. Certainly preparers and practitioners help their 
clients to understand the tax system and meet their legal obligations. In the 
event of an audit, practitioners may also be more 11efficient" than their clients 
in dealing with the IRS, lowering costs to both their clients and the IRS. At 
the same time, "practitioners often challenge the tax agency's interpretation 
and application of tax laws" (Kinsey, 1987, p. 2), and may even induce their 
clients to adopt more aggressive tax avoidance strategies than the clients would 
use on their own. 
Crude evidence suggests a linkage between taxpayer use of preparers or 
practitioners and noncompliance. IRS data indicates that 44. 2 percent of the 
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individual returns filed in 1979 were self-prepared, and that these returns 
accounted for 22. 8 percent of detected noncompliance. Returns prepared with 
third-party assistance accounted for 55. 8 percent of filings and 77. 2 percent 
of the detected noncompliance. Among returns prepared with third-party 
assistance, however, underreported tax was not uniformly distributed. Only 10.6 
percent of all taxpayers used a tax practitioner, yet their returns accounted 
for 32. 5 percent of underreported tax; 34. 7 percent used other paid preparers 
accounting for 40. 9 percent of underreported tax; and the remaining 10. 4 percent 
used non-paid assistance accounting for 3. 7 percent of underreported tax. 1
With regard to penalties, " Section 6694(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 
provides penalties of up to $100 for an understatement of taxpayer liability 
resulting from the failure of a tax return preparer to exercise due diligence 
in applying income tax laws2. In addition, in order to enforce stricter 
standards of diligence, the IRS has recently proposed amending the regulations 
governing tax practitioners who are eligible to practice before the IRS" (Coyne, 
1987, p. 1). And, while the IRS's Office of Practice does not directly regulate 
return preparation, it can (and does) secure court injunctions to keep some 
There is a small but growing literature on tax practitioners. This 
literature emphasizes two general roles for practitioners in the revenue 
collection process: practitioners as providers of services and practitioners 
as providers of information. Scotchmer (1989a, 1989b) and Beck, Davis and Jung 
(1989) provide examples of the latter. Klepper and Nagin (1989) develop several 
hypotheses about practitioner effects on compliance and examine empirical 
evidence related to them. Their findings "suggest that preparers play a mixed 
role in the compliance process. On the one hand they appear to contribute to 
noncompliance by helping taxpayers exploit ambiguous features of the tax code. 
On the other hand, however, they appear to enforce legally unambiguous features 
of the tax code and also to be important conduits for communicating tax agency 
enforcement priorities" (p. 1). Erard (1990), using a random sample of the 1979 
TCMP individual records, finds that the probability of using a practitioner 
relative to self-preparation increases with increases in the IRS district audit 
rate. Dubin, et. al. (1989), working with district level aggregates of the 1979 
confirm the latter finding but also find that increases 
in the IRS district level audit rate have no effect on the demand for other 
third-party assistance, whether paid (e. g. , preparers) or non-paid (e. g. , IRS 
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assistance). 
Our model focuses on tax practitioners as providers of services. Our 
typical taxpayer knows the law and is, in principle, capable of preparing his 
own return in an optimal fashion1 allowing for audit rates and audit costs, the 
latter both in terms of direct penalties and oppportunity costs. He may prefer 
to use a practitioner, though, because it can reduce the costs of return 
preparation and, in case of enforcement proceedings, provide an alternative to 
self-representation. In this setting the taxpayer first chooses whether to 
prepare his own tax return or to use a practitioner. 
either directly by taxpayers or by practitioners 
Next returns are filed, 
on behalf of taxpayers. 
Finally, the tax agency decides how much enforcement effort to devote to a given 
return; this decision may be contingent upon whether the return was filed by the 
taxpayer or by a practitioner on behalf of the taxpayer. 
Assuming a quadratic enforcement cost function and an objective of expected 
net revenue maximization for the tax authority, we characterize the equilibrium 
reporting behavior of taxpayers (with and without a practitioner) and the 
enforcement behavior of the tax agency (with respect to taxpayer-filed and 
practitioner-filed returns). We describe circumstances under which each of the 
------rfo--1--l-o-wing equilib-r:iwn situations arises: (a) the tax agency and the taxpayer both
prefer that the taxpayer use a practitioner; (b) the tax agency and the taxpayer 
both prefer that the taxpayer file his own return; (c) the tax agency prefers 
that the taxpayer use a practitioner, but the taxpayer prefers to file his own 
return; and finally, (d) the tax agency prefers that the taxpayer file his own 
return, but the taxpayer prefers to use a practitioner. When the tax agency 
prefers that the taxpayer file his own return (cases (b) and (d) above), the 
taxpayer would file a more compliant return than would have been filed had he 
used a practitioner. However, when the tax agency prefers that the taxpayer use 
a practitioner, it need not follow that the practitioner-filed return is more 
compliant than that which the taxpayer would have filed without a practitioner. 
In some cases, the tax agency prefers a practitioner-filed return, even though 
it is less compliant. This is because of the additional penalty revenue to be 
had from noncompliant practitioners. 
When practitioner penalties are sufficiently low and gains to the taxpayer 
from using a practitioner are sufficiently high, the tax agency will prefer that 
the taxpayer file 1-iis own return, but the taxpayer will prefer to use a 
practitioner (case (d) above). Compliance falls and audit rates rise (relative 
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to self-preparation). This is precisely the empirically relevant case, however, 
and is consistent with the limited data now available. In other words, the 
results of this paper show that the service aspects of tax practitioners alone 
are enough to explain the existing stylized facts regarding the relationship 
between practitioners, noncompliance and enforcement. 
We also consider the possibility that the tax agency cares only about 
expected tax revenue net of enforcement costs4 (that is, it does not include 
penalty revenue in its objective function). When penalty revenue is irrelevant 
to the tax agency, the optimal enforcement functions for taxpayer-filed and 
practitioner-filed returns coincide, but practitioner-filed returns are always 
less compliant than taxpayer-filed returns. Thus, conditional only on the use 
of a practitioner, audit rates are higher. 
In Section 2 we describe our basic model. Section 3 contains a statement
of equilibrium conditions, and Section 4 presents an extended algebraic example. 
Section 5 summarizes the impact of omitting penalty revenue from the tax 
authority's objective function. Section 6 presents a brief conclusion including 
suggestions for future research. 
The three types of participants in our compliance game are (1) taxpayers, 
(2) tax practitioners and (3) the tax agency. 5 Because we are not explicitly 
concerned with the effects of taxpayer risk aversion, we assume that each 
taxpayer maximizes expected net income. Tax practitioners are assumed to form 
a monopolistically competitive industry. They exchange their services for a 
fixed fee, with price competition constraining equilibrium profits to a normal 
level. Finally, we assume the tax agency's objective is to maximize revenue 
net of audit costs, taking as given the tax and penalty schedules and taxpayers' 
reported incomes. Thus, we assume that it is net revenue, rather than welfare, 
which motivates the tax agency. This is largely consistent with actual audit 
policy, which is based upon a "yield" criterion (the 11DIF" score); that is, a 
return is more likely to be audited the greater the additional taxes and 
penalties it is expected to yield. 6 In addition, the IRS permits taxpayers 
certain nominal deviations from known tax liability; pursuing small evaders is 
simply not cost-effective (Reinganum and Wilde, 1988) . Finally, since most 
nor1compliance takes t11e form of under- rather than over-reporting, the tax 
agency's self-professed objective to "encourage and achieve the highest 
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possible degree of voluntary compliance in accordance with the tax law and 
regulations" (American Bar Association Commission on Taxpayer Compliance, 1987) -
- comes close to revenue maximization. The key difference is that the pure 
compliance objective ignores penalty revenue. Maximizing tax revenue alone net 
of audit costs, while perhaps less realistic than maximizing total revenue net 
of audit costs, may be the objective function which comes closest to the stated 
objective of the IRS. It is considered in Section 5. 
We assume that the tax agency takes taxpayer reports as given and behaves 
optimally in response to these reports, rather than choosing a policy which is 
designed to induce truthful reporting. 7 There are several reasons for making
this assumption. First, the logical order of play involves the tax agency moving 
last; any attempt to commit ex ante to an enforcement policy is not credible, 
because it is known that the tax agency's ex post incentives will generally 
dictate a different policy. Moreover, since an optimal policy will typically 
involve probabilistic enforcement and unobservable effort by the tax agency, 
taxpayers will have difficulty verifying whether an ex ante announced policy 
has been carried out. 
reputation mechanism. 
This makes it difficult to establish commitment via a 
Second, the formula for scoring returns and selecting 
------rthl1�emn'l �fFco�r--ruurtne-audits - - tl1e DIF - - is ccm-�rtn11;-e-eU-on-tITe----rr-a-s---rs--of a large 
set of especially comprehensive audits, and then applied to the remaining 
returns. Again this suggests that enforcement efforts respond to taxpayer 
reports, rather than vice versa. 8
Let I denote a taxpayer's true gross income. We assume that I is common 
knowledge (due, for example, to employer reporting of earnings). 9 Let x denote
the taxpayer's reported taxable income; that is, the taxpayer understates taxable 
income by the amount I-x (as will be seen, it is never in the taxpayer's interest 
to over-report). Let t and "r denote the tax and penalty rates for the taxpayer, 
respectively, where the penalty rate "r is applied to unpaid tax. Let ur denote 
the taxpayer's perceived cost of preparing his own tax return, and let vT denote 
the taxpayer's perceived cost of complying with the tax agency's enforcement 
action. These represent the money values associated with the disutility of 
effort involved in tax preparation and in dealing with the tax agency in 
enforcement proceedings, respectively. Let rrp represent a penalty rate to which 
practitioners are subject; that is 1 a practitioner whose client is assessed 
additior1al taxes arid per1alties is subject to a fir1e at tl-1e rate 7rp tintes the
unpaid tax. 11 Let up and Vp denote the practitioner's costs of tax preparation 
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and compliance with enforcement action. Finally, let F denote the practitioner's 
fee. We assume that the costs to the taxpayer of (1) complying with enforcement 
proceedings and (2) preparing the return exceed the analogous costs for the 
practitioner. 
Assumption 1. vT > Vp and uT > up. 
Enforcement is assumed to be both costly and stochastic; that is, costly 
effort must be devoted to enforcement and detection may be uncertain. Following 
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) , we assume that a level of examiner effort e (which 
is expended on scrutinizing a return) generates a probability of detection p (e) 
with p'(e) � 0 and p" (e) < 0. Alternatively, one could invert this function to 
obtain the level of effort needed to generate a given probability of detection 
e (p) on each return, with e' (p) � 0 and e" (p) > 0. In this spirit, we let c (p) 
denote the cost (per return) of the effort level required to generate p. Then 
c' (p) � 0 and c" (p) > 0. Note that we are not assuming that c' (p) approaches 
infinity as p nears l; it is not infinitely costly at the margin to guarantee 
that an audit will be perfect, so this choice is feasible. 
The tax agency's expected net revenue from a taxpayer who files his own 
e urn and reports income x, given that the probability of detection is p, can 
be written 
Rr (p,x) � p[tI+t�r(I-x)] + (1-p)tx - c(p) . (1) 
The tax agency's expected net revenue from a taxpayer who uses a practitioner 
and reports income x, given that the probability of detection is p, can be 
written 
Rp(p,x) � p [tI+t (nr+np) (I-x) J + (1-p) tx - c (p) . (2) 
In each case, the tax agency is assumed to choose a probability of detection 
function (or, alternatively, an "enforcement function11) p (x) so as to maximize 
its expected net revenue. When �P > 0, the tax agency may choose to devote a 
different level of effort to the examination of taxpayer-filed and practitioner­
filed returns. Let Pr (x) and pp(x) denote the optimal enforcement functions for 
taxpayer-filed and practitioner-filed returns, respectively. 
Since the taxpayer is assumed to be risk-neutral, his payoff is expected 
income net of tax-related payments. Given that true income is I, reported 
taxable income is x, and the tax agency uses the optimal enforcement function 
Pr (x), if the taxpayer elects to prepare his own return, expected net income is 
Nr(x,pT(x)) � Pr (x) [I-tI-tnr (I-x)-vrJ + [1-pr (x)] (I-tx) - Ur· (3) 
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The taxpayer is assumed to choose x < I so as to maximize this expression, and 
we let xT denote the optimal report for a taxpayer who files his own return. 
We assume that practitioners offer two services to taxpayers. First they 
prepare the taxpayer's return, which relieves the taxpayer of the expense ur. 
Second, they represent the taxpayer in enforcement proceedings, significantly 
reducing or even, as we shall assume, eliminating the cost vr. The practitioner 
is assumed to exchange this bundle of services for the fee F. 12 
Given that true income is I, reported taxable income is x, and the tax 
agency uses the optimal enforcement function pp(x), 
practitioner who charges the fee F, expected net 
practitioner's fee) is 
if the taxpayer 
income (gross 
Np (X,pp(x)) � pp(x) [I-tI-trrr(I-x)] + [1-pp (x)] (I-tx). 
uses a 
of the 
(4) 
The taxpayer is assumed to choose x �I so as to maximize Np (X,pp(x)) - F, 
and we let Xp denote the optimal report for the taxpayer who uses a practitioner. 
Finally, profits to the practitioner are the product of the number of 
returns prepared and the profit margin on each. Let n(F;E) denote an indicator 
function which takes on the value n (F; E) � 1 if the taxpayer elects to use this 
practitioner at the fee F when the minimum of all other practitioners' fees is 
----�'[ , and n(F;l'_) 0 otherwise. Ifie taxpayer will choose not to use this 
particular practitioner whenever either the fee leaves the taxpayer with 
negative net income or some other practitioner is charging a lower fee. Then 
expected profits to the practitioner (per return filed) can be written 
Il (F; E) - n (F; E) [F - Up - pp (Xp) (trrp(I-xp) + Vp)]. (5) 
3 . Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to restate and clarify the assumed 
order of play. First, practitioners set a fee. Next, taxpayers decide whether 
to use a practitioner (and which one). Then returns are filed, either by the 
taxpayer himself or by the practitioner on behalf of the taxpayer. Finally, the 
tax agency chooses its enforcement function. 
Thus a strategy for the practitioner is a fee, F. A strategy for the 
taxpayer consists of two levels of reported income xT and Xp (the first is used 
if the taxpayer files his own return and the second is used if a practitioner 
files on behalf of the taxpayer) and a decision about whether to use a 
practitior1er (arid 1.v1-1icl1 one). A strategy for the tax agency is an enforcement 
function for taxpayer-filed returns, Pr (x), and another (possibly different) 
enforcement function for practitioner-filed returns, pp(x). 
Definition. A subgame perfect equilibrium consists of: a decision 
regarding the use of a practitioner and a pair of scalars (xr.xp) ; 
a pair of functions (pr (x) , pp (x) ) ;  and a scalar F0, such that: 
(a) Pi (x) maximizes Ri (x,p) , i � T,P. 
(b) xi maximizes Ni (x,pi(x) ) ,  i � T, P. 
(c) The taxpayer uses a practitioner if and only if 
Np (Xp, pp (xp) ) - F0 > Nr(Xr,PrCxr)) · 
(d) F0 maximizes Il (F;F0). 
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Given the assumed order of play, a subgame perfect equilibrium for the 
model can be characterized using backward induction. Given that income x is 
reported on a taxpayer-filed return, the tax agency chooses p so as to maximize 
Rr(x, p) . Because Rr(x,p) is strictly concave in p, the optimal value of p, 
Pr(x), is characterized as follows: 
if t (l+rrr) (I-x) > c' (l) , then 
if t (l+rrr) (I-x) < c' (0), then 
Pr (x) 
Pr (x) 
l· , 
O· , 
otherwise Pr (x) E [0, 1] and is given implicitly by 
-------------rt-=rr..-r-'l'(T-X) c' Pr x (6) 
Similarly1 if income x is reported on a practitioner-filed return, the tax 
agency chooses p so as to maximize Rp(x,p). The optimal value of p, pp(x), is 
characterized as follows: 
if t (l+rrr+rrp) (I-x) > c'(l), then pp(x) 
if t (l+rrr+rrp) (I-x) < c'(O) , then pp(x) 
l· , 
O· , 
otherwise, pp(x) E [0, 1] and is given implicitly by 
t (l+rrr+rrp) (I-x) � c' (pp(x) ) .  (7) 
It is clear that when x � I, Pr(x) � pp(x) � 0; that is, it never pays to 
allocate enforcement effort to a return which reports taxable income equal to 
gross income I. From equations (6) and (7), it is also straightforward to show 
that for Pi(x) E (0,1) , Pi(·) is a decreasing function of reported income x (i 
� T, P) .  In addition, the functions Pi (x) shift upward with an increase in t, rrr 
or I (and pp(x) shifts upward with an increase in rrp). That is, an increase in 
taxes, penalties, or taxable income results in greater enforcement effort for 
any level of reported income. Finally, a comparison of (6) and (7) yields the 
followi11g result. 
Proposition 1. So long as practitioner penalties Kp are strictly 
positive, greater enforcement effort will be devoted to a 
practitioner-filed return than to a taxpayer-filed return which 
reports the same level of income. That is, pp(x) > Pr (x) (unless 
both equal 0 or 1). 
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This is because the tax agency expects a greater return from detecting 
noncompliance on a practitioner-filed return, since it collects penalty revenue 
from both the taxpayer and the practitioner in the event that noncompliance is 
detected. 
A taxpayer who elects to file his own return chooses reported income x so 
as to maximize Nr(X,pr (x)) as given above in equation (3). First- and second­
order necessary conditions for an interior optimum xr are 
Pr (x) [-t(l+ir ) (I-x) - vrl + Pr(x)t (l+ir ) - t - 0 (8) 
and 
Pr" (x) [-t (l+ir ) (I-x) vrl + 2pr'(x)t (l+irr) � 0. (9) 
Xr < I, then Pr(xr) < l/ (1+1rr). Otherwise it is It follows from (8) that if 
preferable to report x I. Assuming xr < I  is uniquely defined by (8), and 
that the second-order cond1t1on (9) holds with a strict inequality, it is
straightforward to show that Xr increases with the parameter vr; the taxpayer 
reports more income the greater his disutility of being involved in enforcement 
proceedings . 
If the taxpayer uses a practitioner, he avoids the cost uT and the expected 
cost Pr (x)vr, but he pays the fee F and faces a uniformly higher enforcement 
function, pp (x). This results in the payoff function Np(X,pp (x)) - F, where 
Np(x,pp (x)) is given in equation (4). This yields the following first-order 
condition describing Xp. 
pp' (x) [-t(l+1r ) (I-x)] + pp (x)t (1+1r ) - t - 0. (10) 
Assuming that equation (10) yields a unique value for Xp, the taxpayer can 
then decide whether or not to use a practitioner charging the fee F by comparing 
Nr(xr, Pr (Xr)) and Np(Xp,pp (xp)) - F: the taxpayer uses a practitioner charging F 
if and only if Np(Xp, pp (Xp)) F > Nr(Xr,Pr (xr)). 
Our last equilibrium condition follows from the assumption that the 
practitioner industry is monopolistically competitive. Each practitioner, in 
order to keep 11is clier1ts, 1nust charge no more than the minimum fee being 
offered in the industry. However, by slightly undercutting the existing minimum 
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fee, the practitioner can steal clients from competitors. This results in a 
Bertrand-like competition in fees, with the equilibrium fee given by 
F0 � Up + pp (Xp) (trrp (I-xp) + Vp] · (11) 
4. An Example 
Since our model involves sequential moves, there is no guarantee that the 
problems of the taxpayer and the tax practitioner are well-behaved. 
Consequently, it is difficult to derive completely general results, since 
conclusions based on an examination of general first-order conditions might well 
be invalid. Instead we explore in some detail an illustrative example which 
shows that the theory is not vacuous and which allows us to characterize 
equilibrium behavior fully. 
Let the enforcement cost function be c (p) � cp2. In this case perfect 
enforcement is possible, and at finite cost (and finite marginal cost). 
However, perfect enforcement is not optimal for all values of reported income. 
Maximizing RT(x,p) yields Pt(x) � min { 1 , t (l+rrt) (I-x)/2c }. 
Under the following assumption, the taxpayer's optimal report will be 
strictly less than his income; if this assumption does not hold, then optimal 
euforcencent results in perfect compliance. lhe perfect compliance case is 
obviously the less interesting one, so we will focus on the case of imperfect 
compliance. 
Assumption 2. 2c > vT (l+rrT). 
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, expected net income to the taxpayer who files his 
own return (and faces the enforcement function Pt(x)) can be described as a 
function of reported income x as shown below in Figure l. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Given the enforcement policy Pt (x) for the tax agency, the taxpayer's 
expected net income function has a unique maximum, with the optimal amount of 
noncompliance given by I-xT � [2c - vT (l+rrt)l/2t(l+rrT)2• 
incentive for the taxpayer to randomize his report. 
Thus, there is no 
1·1axin1izir1g Rp (x,p) yields pp(x) =min { 1 , t (l+7rt+7rp) (I-x)/2c } . Recall 
from Proposition 1 that a revenue-maximizing tax agency i;vill devote more effort 
11 
FIGURE 1 
I x 
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to a practitioner-filed return. This difference in treatment by the tax agency 
will feed back into the taxpayer's reporting decision. 
Given the enforcement policy pp(x) for the tax agency, the taxpayer's 
expected net income function has a unique maximum, with the optimal amount of 
noncompliance given by I-xp � c/t (l+rrr+1Tp) (l+rrr). Expected net income to the 
taxpayer who uses a practitioner (and faces the corresponding enforcement 
function pp (x)) is illustrated below in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
It is straightforward to characterize when compliance is higher with a 
practitioner than without. Define ¢ (rrr) = vr (l+,,.r)2/[2c-vr(l+,,.r)l .
Propes i ti on 2. Compliance is higher, the same, or lower with a 
practitioner than without as the practitioner penalty exceeds, 
equals, or is less than ¢ (,,.r). That is, Xp (>, �, <) xr as rrp (>, �, <) 
¢ ("r)· 
-----�'fhe funcrion ?rp "iji{7rr) 1s positive, increasing and convex in 1Tr· This is
illustrated below in Figure 3. Assumption 2 limits the domain of "r to [0, (2c­
vr)/vr). 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Thus one could have either higher or lower compliance with a practitioner. 
The existence of practitioner penalties makes detection more likely for a given 
report (because greater examiner effort is devoted due to the potential for 
higher penalty revenue), which tends to increase compliance; on the other hand, 
the taxpayer is effectively " insured11 against the loss vr, which will tend to 
decrease compliance. 
We next compare pp (Xp) and Pr (xr) to obtain the combined effect of 
practitioners on the equilibrium likelihood of detection. Substituting the 
taxpayer's optimal reports into the agency's optimal enforcement functions 
yields pp (Xp) � l/2 (l+rrr) and Pr(xr) � [1/2 (1+,,.r)J - vr/4c. 
Proposi t.ion 3. Assuming that the taxpayer reports optimally in each 
case, a taxpayer who uses a practitioner will face a higher 
Np(I,0)
Np(I-2c/t(l+.<T+.<P),l)
FIGURE 2 
I 
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x 
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FIGURE 3 
likelihood of detection than a taxpayer who files his own return. 
That is, pp (Xp) > PT (xT). 
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To determine whether the tax agency would prefer taxpayer-filed or 
practitioner-filed returns, we first observe that equilibrium revenue from a 
practitioner-filed return is 
Rp (Xp,pp(Xp)) � tI + c/4 (l+rrT)2 - c/ (l+rrT) (l+rrT+rrp) 
while equilibrium revenue from a taxpayer-filed return is given by 
RT (xT,PT(xT)) � tI + [2c-vT (l+rrr)J2/16c (l+rrr)2 - [2c-vT (l+rrT)]/2 (l+rrT)2. 
Define � (rrT) = (l+rrT)A/(16c2-A), where A= 4cvT (l+rrT) + (vT)2 (l+rrT)2 < 16c2 under 
Assumption 2. 
Proposition 4. The tax agency prefers a practitioner-filed return, 
is indifferent, or prefers a taxpayer-filed return as the 
practitioner penalty exceeds, equals, or is less than � (rrT). That 
is, Rp (Xp,pp (Xp)) (>, �, <) RT (xT,PT (xT)) as rrp (>, �,<) � (rrT). 
The function �(rrT) is positive, increasing and convex, with ¢Crrr) < ¢(rrT); 
that is, the 11equal reporting" line lies everywhere above the 11equal revenue"
line as shown below in Figure 4. Intuitively, along the curve rrp � ¢ (rrT), 
practitioner-filed returns and taxpayer-filed returns are equally noncompliant, 
but taxpayer-filed returns are more heavily audited and generate penalty revenue 
from both taxpayers and practitioners. Thus along this curve, Rp > Rr; lowering 
rrp lowers Rp until the equality Rp � RT (i. e. , rrp � � (rrT)) is reached. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
This permits us to make the following comparison. 
Proposition 5. Whenever the tax agency prefers taxpayer-filing to 
practitioner-filing, taxpayer-filing results in greater compliance 
than does practitioner-filing. However, the converse is not true; 
for some (rrr,rrp) combinations, taxpayer-filing results in greater 
compliance than practitioner-filing yet the tax agency prefers 
practitioner-filing to taxpayer-fiiing. That is, sometimes the tax 
agency prefers the less compliant return. 
16 
FIGURE 4 
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Finally, i;ve need to determine when taxpayers will choose to use a 
practitioner. Monopolistic competition in the practitioner industry implies 
that fees are bid down until the practitioner just breaks even: 
P0 � Up +  vp/2 (l+rrr) + crrp/2(l+rr +rrp)(l+rrr)2• 
Subs ti tu ting this value into Np (Xp, pp (xp)) - P yields equilibrium expected net 
income to a taxpayer who uses a practitioner: 
Np(Xp,pp (Xp)) - P0 � I  - tI - up - Vp/2 (l+rrr) + c (l+rrr-rrp)/2 (l+rrr+1rp) (l+rrr>2· 
This value is then compared with equilibriwn net income to a taxpayer who files 
his own return: 
NrCxr,PrCxr)) � I  - tI - ur + [2c-vr (l+rrr)J2/8c(l+rrr)2• 
Then Np (Xp,pp(Xp)) - P0 (>, �, <) NrCxr,PrCxr)) as 
(1 + "r)B("r) (>,�,<) 1rp(8c2 - B (rrr)), 
where B (rr ) s 8c (ur-up) (l+rrr)2 + 4c (vr-vp) (l+rr ) - (vr)2(1+7rr)2. This yields three 
possible cases. 
Proposition 6. 
(a) If B (7rr) < 0, then Np - P0 < Nr and the taxpayer will file his own 
(b) If B (rrr) > 8c2, then Np - P0 > Nr and the taxpayer will use a 
practitioner. 
(c) If B (rrr) E (0,8c2), then Np - P0 (>,�,<) Nr as rrp (<, �, >) µ (7r ),
where µ (rr ) s (l+rr )B (rrr)/ [8c2 - B (rr )J. 
A sufficient condition for B(rrr) < 0 is that the practitioner is no more 
efficient than the taxpayer at preparation or at representing the taxpayer 
before the tax agency; that is, ur = up and vr = Vp. On the other hand, a 
sufficient condition for B(rr ) > 8c2 is that these efficiencies (that is, Ur-Up 
and vr-vp) are sufficiently large. When case (c) arises, it follows that µ (rr ) 
> 0. 
Due to the large number of parameters in this problem, it is extremely 
tedious to characterize the equilibrium associated with each combination of 
parameter values, and the problem does not seem to lend itself to a 
comprehensive graphical summary. However, given any set of parameters of 
interest, the Propositions above will fully describe the equilibrium behavior 
of taxpayers, tax practitioners and the tax agency. 
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By combining Propositions 4 and 6, we are able to describe sufficient 
conditions for the equilibrium to take on a given configuration in terms of 
preferences regarding practitioner use. In each case, practitioners just break 
even and are thus indifferent about whether or not a taxpayer uses a 
practitioner. 
Proposition 7. Each of the following cases arises for some set of 
parameters. 
(a) the tax authority and the taxpayer both prefer that the taxpayer use 
a practitioner. This case arises when 1rp > i/JC"r) and B(1rr) > 8c2•
In this case, practitioner efficiencies are large, and the 
taxpayer's return is more or less compliant than it would have been 
(had he filed it himself) as 1rp (>, �, <) ¢(7rr). Thus for 1rp < ¢(7rr), 
the taxpayer is less compliant due to the use of a practitioner1 but 
this is preferred by the tax agency. For 1rp > ¢(7rr), the taxpayer
prefers to use a practitioner despite the fact that this results in 
greater compliance and a greater likelihood of detection. 
(b) the tax agency and the taxpayer both prefer that the taxpayer file 
---------------nrr-s-owr1 return. ih1s case arises when 11"p < 1jJ(7rr) and B(7rr) < 0. In 
this case, practitioner efficiencies are small, and the taxpayer's 
return is more compliant than it would have been had he used a 
practitioner. 
(c) the tax agency prefers that the taxpayer use a practitioner, but the 
taxpayer prefers to file his own return. This case arises when 1rp 
> i/JC"r) and BC�r) < 0. In this case, practitioner efficiencies are
small, and the taxpayer's return is more or less compliant than it 
would have been (had a practitioner been used) as 1rp (>, �, <) ¢C"r). 
For 1rp > ¢(7rr), the less compliant practitioner-filed return is
preferred by the tax agency, but the taxpayer elects to file his own 
return. 
(d) the tax agency prefers that the taxpayer file his own return, but 
the taxpayer prefers to use a practitioner. This case arises when 
"P < i/J(7rr) and B(1rr) > 8c2. In this case, practitioner efficiencies
are large and taxpayer compliance is lower than it would have been 
had the taxpayer filed l-1is ow11 return. 
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Recent discussion of the effect of tax practitioners has suggested that 
the use of practitioners results in less compliant returns and lower revenues 
to the tax agency. This has resulted in increased practitioner penalties. If 
we assume that the 11empirically relevant case11 involves (1) practitioner 
penalties which are quite low, and (2) practitioner efficiencies sufficient to 
induce taxpayers to use practitioners, then we can associate the regime of the 
recent past with case (d) above. When practitioner penalties are negligible (rrp 
= 0), the use of practitioners results in lower revenues to the tax agency 
(since rrp � 0 < �Crrr)) and less compliant returns (since rrp < � (rrr) implies rrp < 
� (rrr)). Moreover, increasing practitioner penalties (while remaining in this 
regime) increases both compliance and expected net revenues. 
5. The Pure Compliance Objective Function
Assuming that the tax code itself embodies any welfare-maximizing 
principles of government, one plausible alternative objective for the tax agency 
is simply to enforce that code when it is cost-effective to do so (i.e. , 
ignoring any additional revenue which penalties might generate, but still 
remaining cognizant of enforcement costs). This implies that the tax agency's 
o Jective is to maximize expected tax revenue net of enforcement costs (since 
over-reporting is a dominated strategy, we need not worry about this aspect of 
improper payment). Let Rr (x,p) denote the tax agency's payoff from a return 
filed by the taxpayer and reporting income x, if the probability of detection 
is given by p. Let Rp(x,p) denote the analogous payoff from a practitioner-
filed return. Then 
Ri(x,p) � ptI + (1-p)tx - cp2,
for i = T, P. Thus when penalty revenue is ignored, the tax agency's objective 
is independent of who filed the return. Consequently, so is the optimal 
enforcement function: pp(x) � PT(x) � t (I-x)/2c. The taxpayer's expected net 
income function is as previously described by Ni(x,pi (x)), resulting in 
equilibrium noncompliance of I-xr � (2c-vr)/2t (l+rrT) and I-xp � c/t (l+rrT) for the 
cases of taxpayer-filed and practitioner-filed returns, respectively. Notice 
that now practitioner-filed returns are always less compliant than taxpayer­
filed returns, since no extra effort is devoted to enforcement on practitioner­
filed returns (as was the case in Sections 3 and 4). The equilibrium payoffs 
to t1-1e tax ager1cy are now 
RT � tI + (2c - vr)2/16c (l+rrr)2 - (2c - vr)/2(l+rrr)
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and 
Rp � tI + c/4 (l+nr)2 - c/ (l+nr).
A comparison of these two implies that the tax agency always prefers that a 
taxpayer file his own return, rather than using a practitioner. Finally, 
equilibrium expected net income for taxpayer-filed and practitioner-filed 
returns are now given by, respectively: 
Nr � I - tI - ut + (2c - vr)2/8c(l+nr)
and 
Np - F0 � I - tI - up - vp/2 (1+7rr) + c (l+nr - np)/2 (l+nr)2,
where the latter incorporates the equilibrium fee F0 � up + Vp/2 (l+nr) + 
C7rp/2 (l+nr)2.
Comparing net incomes under the two filing methods yields: 
Nr (>,�,<) Np - F0 as 7rp (>,�,<) B (nr)/4c2, where
Sc Cur-up) (l+nr)2 + 4c (v1-vp) (l+?rr) - (v1)2 (1+1rr). Thus for sufficiently
large practitioner efficiencies, practitioners will be used, despite the tax 
agency's preference for taxpayer-filed returns. For sufficiently small 
practitioner efficiencies, practitioners will be eschewed. 
It is possible to compare the equilibrium outcomes under these alternative 
������,onb•Jr·e�c� t�i�v e--ti:r�n�c�t�i7o�t�1so- . �---,Rne�lranft�i�v�e.--rt�o.--rt"h�e.--r �e�g"i'mrue,--'i"n,--"w"h�i�cnfi�'P"epnnoaolt �y,->r�e�v'-e�nnu""e �i,.,s������ 
included in the objective function, the regime which excludes penalty revenue 
involves: (1) a lower probability of detection (for a given level of reported 
income), for both types of return; (2) greater noncompliance, for both types of 
return; (3) a higher equilibrium probability of detection for taxpayer-filed 
returns, and the same equilibrium probability of detection for practitioner­
filed returns (note: this probability is the composition of items (1) and (2)); 
( 4) higher equilibrium expected net income for taxpayers, for both types of 
return; and (5) higher equilibrium practitioner fees. These results follow from 
the fact that the tax agency follows a less aggressive enforcement policy when 
penalty revenue is excluded from its objective function. 
6. Conclusion
The model we have developed in this paper emphasizes the pure service 
aspects of tax practitioners their potential for lowering the costs to 
taxpayers of filing returns and facing the risk of detection. We have ignored 
therefore ar1y purely ir1forr11atior1al role practitioners might play, for exampie, 
by providing expertise on legal requirements or identifying strategies for 
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minimizing tax liability. In fact, we have asswned away all informational 
asymmetries. Nevertheless we find that the effect of practitioners on the 
voluntary reporting behavior of taxpayers, and on the enforcement behavior and 
expected net revenues of the tax agency, can be quite complex. For the tax 
agency objective of expected net revenue maximization, the use of practitioners 
results in greater efforts at detection by the tax authority. However, depending 
on a variety of parameters, the use of practitioners can result in more or less 
compliance in equilibrium, and higher or lower expected net revenue to the tax 
agency. 
When penalty revenue is excluded from the tax agency's objective function, 
the optimal enforcement functions for taxpayer- filed and practitioner-filed 
returns coincide, and practitioner-filed returns are less compliant than 
taxpayer-filed returns. The tax agency always prefers that taxpayers prepare 
their own returns, but when practitioner efficiencies are sufficiently large, 
taxpayers will engage a practitioner instead. 
A great deal of scope remains for future research, much of it associated 
with the incorporation of informational asymmetries into the model, either 
between taxpayers and the practitioner or between taxpayers and the tax agency. 
For example, if some characteristic of taxpayers is unobservable to the tax 
agency but affects the decision to use a practitioner, then the observation that 
a practitioner was used could convey useful information to the tax agency. See 
Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1989) and Beck, Davis and Jung (1989) for 
contributions along these lines. 
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Endnotes 
* This paper is a revision, extension and substantial re-direction of "Tax
Practitioners and Tax Compliance, 1 1  Social Science Working Paper No. 666,
California Institute of Technology, March 1988.
** We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of National Science
Foundation Grants SES-8903157 and SES-8902545 for Reinganum and Wilde,
respectively, and thank two referees for helpful comments.
1. These estimates are based on the Special Academic Research File of the
1979 Individual Return Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP).
See Dubin, et. al. (1989) for details.
2. Stiffer penalties apply if the understatement is "willful" ($500), or for
"aiding and abetting" an understatement ($1000).
3. In a recent article in the Los Angeles Times (Jan. 23, 1988) , it
wasreported that a California tax preparer was sentenced to five years
probation, ordered to pay $10, 000 to compensate the state for
investigation costs in addition to a $20, 000 fine, and to do 500 hours of 
community service work after pleading guilty to four felony counts 
associated with filing false state income tax returns. The preparer had 
claimed $800,000 in fraudulent refunds on 500 state income tax returns.
4. For a more extensive discussion of IRS objectives, see Graetz, Reinganum
and Wilde (1986) . Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1990) provide data on recent
trends in civil penalty rates and criminal enforcement.
5. The classic economic approach to tax compliance dealt primarily with the
behavior of the individual taxpayer when faced with probabilistic audit
(e. g. , Allingham and Sandmo, 1872; Srinivasan, 1973). More recently a tax
agency has been added as an active participant (e. g.,  Landsberger and
Meilijson, 1982; Greenberg, 1984; Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde, 1986;
Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Border and Sobel, 1987; Reinganum and Wilde,
1988; Melumad and Mookherjee, 1989; Mookherjee and P'ng, 1989; Beck and
Jung, 1989; Beck, Davis and Jung, 1989; and Scotchmer and Slemrod, 1989) .
6. For a more extensive discussion of tax agency objectives see Graetz,
Reinganum and Wilde (1986). For models in which the tax agency's
objective is to maximize expected welfare subject to a revenue constraint,
see Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) and Mookherjee and P'ng (1989).
7. For models which allow the tax agency to precommit to an audit strategy
see Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Border and Sobel (1987), Melumad and
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Mookherjee (1989), and Mookherjee and P'ng (1989). 
8. For a more extensive discussion of the no-precommitment assumption, see 
Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986). See 
also Melumad and Mookherj ee (1989), who argue that despite a lack of 
precornmitment ability on the part of the tax agency, if there is a higher
governing body which can precornmit, then this body can (by altering the
tax agency's incentive scheme) induce the tax agency to choose the
" precornmitment-optimal" policy without the tax agency itself being able
to precommitment. We consider the likelihood that such optimal incentives
have been provided to be sufficiently low that a thorough examination of 
the no-precornrnitrnent case is of interest.
9. Recent work by Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Reinganum and Wilde
(1986), Beck and Jung (1989) and Beck, Davis and Jung (1989) has modeled
equilibrium compliance and enforcement under the assumption of asymmetric
information. We use here the common knowledge assumption in order to
focus on issues other than incomplete information, in particular, the
service role of practitioners. This necessitates that c (p) be nonlinear
in order to obtain a well-behaved problem. However, this combination of
assumptions 1s equivalent, from a modeling perspective, to assuming
asymmetric information with respect to true gross income and constant
audit costs, since the associated equilibrium will typically involve
perfect signalling, as shown in Reinganum and Wilde (1986). The latter
model, however, involves a substantial increase in technical complexity,
so parsimony argues in favor of the combination of assumptions used in 
this paper. For a more extensive discussion of the assumption that c (p) 
is nonlinear, see Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
10. The penalty rate "T is assumed to be independent of whether a practitioner
is used. For a model in which the use of a practitioner shields the
taxpayer from some penalties, see Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1989).
11. Actual practitioner penalties do not vary as smoothly with unpaid taxes
as do taxpayer penalties; rather they tend to be lumpy, depending on the
extent of underpayment and the degree of 11intent11 involved (see footnotes
2 and 3). On the other hand, taxpayer penalties are not perfectly 
proportional either; they, too, typically involve lumpiness involving 
=:willful ii noncompliance. We will use a smooth approximation in both cases 
in order to ease calculation. 
... 
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12. We assume that the practitioner charges a flat fee whether or not the
taxpayer suffers enforcement action; thus the taxpayer buys full insurance
against the cost of complying with enforcement action (denoted vT).
However, most CPA' s and tax attorneys charge an additional fee for
representation. In order to attract any customers (especially in the
presence of competition), this fee would have to be less than vr, and
might possibly be as low as Vp. Thus even under the assumption of separate
fees, the taxpayer who uses a practitioner buys partial insurance against
the cost of complying with enforcement action. Completely separate
markets for preparing returns and representing taxpayers in audit
proceedings are difficult to sustain for several reasons in audit
proceedings the practitioner is defending himself as well as his client
and he holds a cost and informational advantage over other practitioners.
We have considered the case in which competition among practitioners
drives the representation fee to vp; the qualitative results of the model
(as summarized in Figures 3 and 4) remain unchanged, though the algebraic
expressions (such as ¢ (rrT) and � (rrT)) are somewhat more complex.
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